Untitled

One of the messengers was killed on the way, the other managed to return to the house desperately wounded. The gathering in the street increased every moment. Burnes with the two officers went out on to a balcony, and from thence harangued the mob. His voice was drowned by yells and curses, weapons were brandished, and an attack was made on the doors of both houses. Part of the mob were fanatics, who thought only of slaying the infidels, but a still larger party were animated solely by a desire to share in the sack of the Ameer's treasury next door. The native guards both of Sir Alexander and the treasury opened fire, and for a time maintained themselves with the greatest bravery. Of the English officers, Broadfoot was the first to fall, shot through the heart. The position became more and more desperate. A party of the insurgents had set fire to the stables and forced their way into the garden. Burnes was still attempting to lull the fury of the crowd. Long ere this troops should have arrived to his rescue, but there were no signs that they were approaching. At last, seeing that all was lost, he disguised himself and went out into the garden with a man who had sworn by the Koran to convey him and his brother safely into camp. No sooner, however, did they issue out than the traitor shouted: "This is Burnes."

The mob rushed upon the brothers and hewed them to pieces. The defenders of the two houses fought bravely to the last, but were finally slaughtered to a man.

Sir Alexander Burnes owed his death to the faults of others rather than his own. Having been previously at Cabul as the British agent, and speaking the language perfectly, it was to him the people made their complaints, to him they looked for redress. They knew nothing of Macnaghten. When they found their condition growing from bad to worse, their taxes increasing, their trade at a stand-still, food extremely dear, and employment wanting, it was on Burnes that they laid the blame; and yet he was all the time endeavouring, but in vain, to persuade Macnaghten that it was absolutely necessary to compel the Ameer to abandon a course that was exasperating for people of all classes, from the most powerful chiefs to the poorest inhabitants of the city. Burnes was unquestionably a man of great ability, and had he been in Macnaghten's place with full power and responsibility, things would probably have turned out differently.

The expedition from the first was a gigantic blunder, undertaken in the teeth of his remonstrances. In any case it was doomed to failure. It was impossible that we could maintain on the throne a man hated by the whole of his subjects—a race of fighting men, jealous to the last degree of their independence, and able to take full advantage of the natural strength of the country. But under the administration of an officer at once firm and resolute, and anxious to conciliate them in every way, the British force might have remained until the Indian government could no longer support the expense of the occupation, and could then have withdrawn quietly with the puppet who had proved himself so utterly incapable of conciliating the people upon whom we had thrust him.

The great fault in the character of Burnes was instability—his alternate fits of sanguine hopefulness and deep depression, and his readiness to believe what suited his mood of the moment. These characteristics were no doubt heightened by the unfortunate position in which he found himself. He had had every reason to expect that in view of his previous residence in Cabul and his knowledge of the character of the people, he would have the post of political officer of the Afghan capital, and he only accepted a secondary position upon the understanding that Macnaghten's appointment was a temporary one, and that he would succeed him. When, however, months and years elapsed, and he was still without any recognized position whatever, when his advice was never adopted and his opinions contemptuously set aside by a man infinitely his inferior, he naturally came to take the worst view of things, and his fits of depression became more frequent. At last he fell, not because his house was isolated, for it could have held out until aid had come, but because the three men whose duty it was to rescue him—Macnaghten, the Ameer, and Elphinstone—were alike vacillating, undetermined, and incompetent.

The Ameer was the only one of these three to take any steps. When he heard of the riot he sent down a regiment of Hindoostanee troops to rescue Burnes. Instead, however, of marching outside the town to the end of the street in which Burnes's house was situated, they entered the city by the nearest gate, and tried to make their way through a maze of narrow lanes. Their advance was desperately opposed. From every house and roof a fire of musketry was kept up, and, after losing two hundred of their number, they fled in utter confusion to the shelter of the citadel. Elphinstone in his report says that he received the news at half-past seven that the town was in a ferment, and shortly after the envoy came and told him that it was in a state of insurrection, but that he did not think much of it, and expected the revolt would shortly subside. Macnaghten suggested that Brigadier Shelton's force should proceed to the Bala Hissar to operate as might seem expedient, while the remaining force was concentrated in the cantonment, and assistance if possible sent to Sir Alexander Burnes.

It was not, however, until between nine and ten that Shelton received his orders; and almost directly afterwards another note arrived telling him not to move, as the Ameer had objected. To this Shelton replied that in an insurrection of the city there was no time for indecision, and recommended the general at once to resolve upon what measures he would adopt. He was then told to march immediately to the Bala Hissar, where he would receive further instructions from Macnaghten. Just as he was marching off, a note came from this officer telling him to halt for further orders. He sent an engineer to ask the reason for this order, but the officer was cut down by an Afghan while dismounting just outside the square where the Ameer was sitting. Soon after this the military secretary himself came with orders for him to enter the citadel. When he arrived there, the Ameer asked him who sent him and what he came there for, and he was forbidden to enter the town. All that he could do was to cover the retreat of the Ameer's Hindoostanee troops. In consequence of all these delays, it was twelve o'clock before Shelton moved into the Bala Hissar, by which time Burnes and his friends had been murdered and the riot had spread. Houses were burned, shops sacked, and the families of several British officers massacred.

It is certain that had the slightest energy been shown, and had a small body of troops been despatched when Burnes's first request for help arrived, the riot would have been nipped in the bud, for all accounts agree that for a considerable time not more than three hundred men took part in the attack, and even when Shelton urged the necessity for prompt measures Burnes might have been saved. Except in the case of the rising at Meerut in the Indian Mutiny, never did such disastrous effects result from the incompetence of a British general.

The day passed slowly to Angus. It was maddening to be helpless when great events were happening. Until it became quite dark no one came near them, but at seven o'clock they heard the bolt of the door withdrawn, and a man entered with a torch, by whose light they at once recognized Hassan, their guide over the passes.

"You here, Hassan!" Angus exclaimed. "I had always thought of you as back again in your tower near Bamian. Is it you who has thus made us prisoners?"

"We were sorry to use force, effendi, but there was no other way. Sadut Khan charged us to look after your safety, and we have kept you in sight for some days. He was living in this house in disguise. He was absent yesterday evening to take part in the conference with the other chiefs, and did not return until after midnight. Then he said, 'There will be a tumult in the city to-morrow, Hassan, and probably the house of the officer Burnes will be attacked. What will come of it I do not know. I myself and the other chiefs are leaving at once, so that if things go badly we can disavow any connection with the affair. The young officer, my friend, is, as you know, at Burnes's house. He must be rescued. Prepare this room for him. If he leaves the house before the attack begins, you must seize him and carry him in here. If his servant is with him, bring him also; he too must be saved. He waited on me kindly, and did all in his power for me. If he should not leave the house, then you and your followers must join the mob and keep together, forcing yourselves to the front, so that you will be the first to enter the house. Take long cloaks to throw round them, and get them out, even at the cost of your lives.'

"I told him that it should be done. You saved his life, and you also saved ours, for we should have been suffocated in the snow-storm had you not cut your way out and come to our rescue. So it has been done. We were glad indeed when we saw you come out. Had you not turned down that lane, I should have come up and accosted you, and, telling you that I had an important message to deliver to you, should have asked you to come with me to a quiet spot, where I might deliver it safely. As it was, directly you turned down, we ran round, and, as you know, captured you without noise and without being observed by you. You will, I trust, pardon me for having laid hands on you; but I had orders from the Khan, who told me that I should have to use force, as he was sure you would not, however great the danger, he persuaded to leave Burnes."

"What has happened?"

"The Englishman and two others with him have been killed. One of the Ameer's regiments entered the town, but was driven back. There is looting going on everywhere. Many have been killed, and many houses burnt."

"But what is our army doing?"

"Nothing. There is a force at the Bala Hissar, the rest are under arms in their camp."

"It seems impossible!" Angus exclaimed. "However," he went on, stifling his indignation for the time, "I have to thank you deeply, Hassan, you and Sadut Khan, for having saved our lives. Assuredly you took the only way to do so; for had you only told me of the danger that threatened Sir Alexander Burnes, I should have returned to warn him and share his fate, whatever it might be. As it was, I cannot blame myself that I was absent. I thank you with all my heart. Pray tell the Khan when you see him that I am deeply grateful to him. He has nobly redeemed his promise, and I hope some day to thank him in person."

"Now, sahib, we will start at once," Hassan said. "I have clothes for you to put over your own, and there is no fear of our being suspected. We will take you to within shot of your camp."

He called out, and his four men entered, bringing with them Afghan disguises. When these were put on, they sallied out at once. The five men were fully armed, and long Afghan guns were given to Angus and Azim. The streets were full of people, for the most part in a state of wild excitement, though the better class looked grave at the prospect of the retribution that would probably fall upon the city, perhaps to-morrow or certainly in a day or two. None paid any attention to the group, who differed in no respect from the majority of those around them. Issuing from one of the gates, they made their way to the cantonments. When within a few hundred yards the Afghans stopped. After a hearty farewell and renewed thanks, Angus and Azim left them. They had taken off their disguises, and offered them to Hassan to carry back, but he said, "You had best keep them; you may want them again. There is no saying what may happen." And they accordingly carried them with them.

In a short time they were challenged by a sentry, and halted till the latter had called a sergeant and four men. Then they went forward. Angus was recognized at once, as he was known by sight to everyone in the camp. In a short time they met an officer, who told them the news of the massacre of Burnes, his brother, and Broadfoot, and their guard, which was already known, as one man had escaped the general slaughter, and had, after hiding for some hours, come into the camp. Angus went at once to Macnaghten's house and sent in his name. The envoy came out into the hall. "I am glad to see that you have escaped, Mr. Campbell. I thought that all had perished, though your name is not specially mentioned as among the victims."

"I was not in the house, sir," Angus replied. "Sir Alexander Burnes had sent me out to gather information, and I and my servant were suddenly seized and carried into a house, where we were kept as prisoners all day. After it was dark we made our escape, having obtained disguises from a friendly Afghan."

"Well, I am glad," Macnaghten said; "but you must excuse me now, for the general is here, and we are holding a council. You had better for to-night take up your quarters in poor Burnes's tent. I shall have time to attend to matters to-morrow."

Although Burnes had his residence in the city, he had a large tent not far from the envoy's house. This he occupied when he had business in camp, and it was here that he received natives who brought him news, or who had grievances that they wished to report to him. Here Angus lay down for the night, with a deep feeling of thankfulness that his life had been spared, mingled with a foreboding that the troubles had only begun, and that there was yet much peril in store before the army were safely out of Afghanistan.

In the morning Angus again went up to the envoy's. "I have been thinking, Mr. Campbell," Macnaghten said when he entered, "as far as I have been able to think on any one subject, how your services can be best utilized temporarily. I think that, if you would not mind, you might be attached to the commissariat, and assist Captain Boyd and Captain Johnson."

"I will gladly do so, sir," Angus said. "I will take up the work at once."

"Anticipating your consent, I have already written a letter for you to take to those officers."

Glad to have work before him, Angus went at once to the commissariat camp. The two officers were at breakfast. Both rose and congratulated him heartily on his escape. "How on earth did you manage it?"

He gave as brief an account as he had done to Sir William Macnaghten, and then handed them the letter he had received from the envoy. "That is good news," Captain Johnson said heartily. "We shall be glad indeed to have your aid. I will have a tent pitched for you at once by the side of ours. Of course you have not breakfasted. Sit down with us. What do you think of the state of affairs? You know a good deal more than we do of the disposition of the Afghan chiefs."

"I think things look very bad," Angus said gravely. "After what seems to me the imbecility shown yesterday, to which the death of my chief is due, it is impossible to feel anything like confidence in the general."

"That is the universal feeling in camp," Captain Johnson said. "If we had Sale here I believe everything would go right, but poor Elphinstone is only fit for a snug armchair in a comfortable club. He is no more able to cope with a crisis like this than an old woman would be. In fact, for choice I would take the average old woman.

"Orders have been given for an attack upon the town to-day, but it is more than likely that it will be countermanded. If Elphinstone can make up his mind to throw his whole force, with the exception of a strong camp guard, against the city, we should certainly carry it. No doubt there might be a considerable loss of life, but that could not be helped. It would certainly be successful. Then I should say we ought to turn the whole of the Afghan population out of the town, move all our provisions and stores there, and settle down for the winter. We could beat off any attack that the Afghans could make against us. As it is, we are terribly anxious about the stores. You know that I originally established all the magazines for the Ameer's army in the Bala Hissar. Then Macnaghten came up with the Ameer from Jellalabad, and he told me that the Ameer objected to the magazines being there. That was quite enough for Macnaghten. He always gives in to the Ameer's wishes, however ridiculous. So we had to leave the storehouses I had built and move out bag and baggage.

"The only place that I could get was the camel sheds half-way between this and the town, and unless a strong garrison is sent down there the Afghans are certain to take possession of them. But Boyd's stores are even more important. They are within four hundred yards of the defences of the camp, and contain all our grain, our hospital stores, our wine and beer, our sugar, and everything else. And if his stores and mine are both lost, we shall have starvation staring us in the face at the end of a week. Just look out over the plain. Since daylight there has been a steady stream of men from the hills, and from all the villages round, flocking into the city; they have heard of the capture of my treasury, and are eager to share in the looting. If they succeed in capturing the stores and provisions, God help us all."

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CHAPTER XIV

A SERIES OF BLUNDERS

Numerous as had been the blunders, and great the mismanagement up to the 2nd of November, matters might yet have been retrieved had the conduct of affairs been in resolute and energetic hands. Macnaghten was personally a brave and fearless man. Had he at last felt the necessity for strong measures, an attack upon the city would certainly have been attended with success. Now that the first burst of hate and passion had passed, the inhabitants were filled with apprehension at the punishment that would fall upon them, and none doubted that the British army would at once attack the town. The army itself expected this, and, furious at the treacherous massacre of Sir Alexander Burnes and his comrades, were burning for the order to attack.

The troops were under arms early, but no orders were issued for a forward movement. Some hours later the 35th regiment of Native Infantry, with two mountain guns, came in from Khoord Cabul, having brushed aside the opposition it had met with on its march. With this valuable addition to the fighting strength in the camp all opposition could have been easily overcome, and yet until three o'clock in the afternoon nothing whatever was done. By this time what could have been effected with comparative ease in the early morning had become a far more difficult operation. Vast numbers of the tribesmen had been pouring into the city since daybreak, and the two miles of plain between the camp and the city, which earlier in the day could have been traversed without a shot being fired, were now covered by a host of fierce enemies; and yet, after wasting so many valuable hours, the general, instead of throwing the whole of the force in the cantonments, and that of Brigadier Shelton at the Bala Hissar, against the city, sent only three companies of infantry and two guns to the attack.

Naturally this handful of men failed; and it was well for them that they did not penetrate into the city, for had they done so they would assuredly have been overwhelmed before they had gone fifty yards. However, the officer in command, seeing the impossibility of the task set him, withdrew his detachment in good order. The result of the day's operation, if it could be so called, was disastrous, the troops, who had until then been eager to be led against the enemy, and confident of success, were irritated and dispirited, and lost all confidence in their commander; while, on the other hand, the Afghans were jubilant over what they considered the cowardice of the enemy. The next day the misfortune invited by the passive attitude of our troops happened. Only eighty men were in charge of the commissariat fort. The little party were commanded by Lieutenant Warren. Early in the day a threatening force of the enemy approached, and Warren sent a messenger urgently asking for reinforcements.

But the Afghans had already occupied an old fort that commanded the road between the camp and the commissariat fort. Considering the enormous importance of the stores, an overwhelming force should have been sent out to drive off the assailants, and to occupy the fort in such strength that it could be held against any assault. Instead of doing this, two companies only of the 44th Regiment were sent. The two captains in command were killed by the fire from the Afghan fort, other officers were wounded, and the men fell so fast that the officer who was senior in command, seeing the impossibility of reaching the store, drew them off. Then an order was issued—which was practically the death-warrant of the army—by General Elphinstone, for a party of cavalry to go out and bring in the little garrison. This party suffered even more severely than the preceding one. From every wall, building, and orchard a storm of musketry broke out, and the troopers, after suffering great loss, again retired. The news that the general intended to abandon the store struck dismay into the officers of the commissariat. Captain Boyd hurried to head-quarters, and urged the general to send a force that would sweep away all opposition, and to hold the fort at all hazards. The general promised to send a reinforcement, but no relief was sent.

As night was coming on, Captain Boyd and Captain Johnson again went to the general and pointed out in the strongest language the result that would follow the abandonment of the stores. The unhappy old man hesitated, but on a letter being brought in from Lieutenant Warren saying that the enemy were mining the walls, and some of the Sepoys, seeing their position was desperate, were deserting, he promised that a strong detachment should be sent at two o'clock in the morning to storm the Afghan fort and relieve the guard at the commissariat stores. Orders were accordingly issued, but these were presently countermanded, and it was decided that the force should not move until daylight.

By that time it was too late. Warren had repulsed an attack on the walls, but seeing that the enemy were preparing to fire the gate and renew the attack, he retired through a passage that had on the previous day been dug under the wall, and reached the camp in safety. But this was not the only disaster that happened that day. Captain Johnson's store of provisions for the use of the Ameer's troops, on the outskirts of the city, was also attacked. Captain Mackenzie, who was in command of the little garrison there, defended his post throughout the day with the greatest gallantry; but water was scarce, and ammunition failing, and large numbers of women and children were in the fort, with great quantities of baggage. Urgent letters were sent asking for reinforcements, but no reinforcements came. Had they arrived the situation would have been saved. The Kuzzilbashes were ready to side with the British. Several of their commanders were with Mackenzie, but when they saw that no help was sent, they refused to join a cause that seemed to them lost. All night the fighting went on, and all next day, until his men were utterly worn out, and the ammunition exhausted. No more could be done, and when night came on, he moved out of the fort and fought his way to the cantonments—a brilliant action, which showed what could be accomplished by a mere handful of men well led.

While Mackenzie was thus fighting for the stores under his charge, the troops in the cantonments were condemned to see crowds of Afghans looting the stores within four hundred yards of our camp, carrying off the supplies that had been garnered for their subsistence through the winter, and this without a man being set in motion or a gun brought to bear upon the plunderers.

Furious at the imbecility of their leaders, the soldiers clamoured to be led against the enemy. Unable to resist the demand, the general ordered the 37th Native Infantry to move out; but instead of being led straight against the enemy, the officer in command hesitated and halted, and soon fell back with the indignant Sepoys.

General Elphinstone was already talking of making terms with the enemy, and seemed to despair of victory when no attempt had been made to gain a success. On the 6th, however, a party of the 37th were again sent out under Major Griffiths. Again it was seen what could be done by an energetic officer. The Afghan fort was stormed, the enemy were driven out, and were routed by a party of horse, who dashed at them gallantly. The troops could be no longer restrained, and cavalry, infantry, and artillery poured out; but there was no general plan, and the consequence was, that although desultory fighting went on all day, nothing was accomplished. Had any general plan of operation been laid down, and a combined action fought, the enemy would have been utterly unable to withstand our troops, worked up to fury as these were by the disgraceful inaction that had been forced upon them. In the meantime, starvation would have already stared the troops in the face had not Captains Boyd and Johnson, aided by Angus and other officers of their department, gone out to the native villages and succeeded in purchasing a certain amount of grain. But already the troops were on half rations, and even these scanty supplies could not long be available.

The general, while his troops were out fighting, wrote to Macnaghten, urging that negotiations should be opened with the enemy, and saying, "Our case is not yet desperate, but it is becoming so very fast."

Macnaghten himself was conscious of this, conscious that, under such leading, the situation was fast becoming desperate, and he employed the moonshee, Mohun Lal, who was still in Cabul under the protection of the Kuzzilbash chief, to endeavour to bribe the chiefs of the Ghilzyes. Two lacs of rupees were offered. The chiefs gave a favourable reply, and then Macnaghten, with his usual instability, was seized with a suspicion that they were not sincere, and abruptly broke off the negotiations, thereby mortally offending the Ghilzye chiefs.

Fresh danger was threatening in another direction. Mahomed Akbar Khan, the second son of Dost Mahomed, was on his way with a force from the north, and had already advanced as far as Bamian. Mohun Lal suggested that an emissary should be sent to offer him a large allowance if he would join the British. His suggestion was carried out, and money was spent in other quarters lavishly.

But it was now too late. A quarter of the sum would, a fortnight earlier, have sufficed to satisfy the demands of all the chiefs of the tribesmen. Now that success had encouraged the assailants of our force, and the whole population had taken up arms against us, inspired alike by fanaticism and hatred and thirsting for blood, it was doubtful whether even the chiefs could restrain them had they chosen to do so.

In their letters and journals the officers still spoke with kindness and respect of their unfortunate general. He had been a brave and able soldier, but age and terrible infirmities had rendered him altogether incapacitated for action. He had for months been suffering from gout, and had almost lost the use of his limbs. Only once or twice, after his arrival to assume the command, had he been able to sit on horseback; for the most part he was wholly unable to walk. Sometimes he was confined altogether to his couch; at others he was able to be taken out in a palanquin. His mind was also enfeebled by suffering. On the very day of the first outbreak he had been a little better, and had mounted his horse; but he had suffered a very severe fall, and was carried back to his quarters.

It was altogether inexcusable that Lord Auckland, against the advice of the commander-in-chief and the remonstrances of his other military advisers, should have appointed such a man to a command which, beyond all others in India, demanded the greatest amount of energy and activity. There were many men who might have been worthily selected, men with a knowledge of the political conditions of Afghanistan, of the feelings of the people, of their language and of their country.

General Elphinstone knew nothing of these things, and depended entirely upon the advice of others. Had he relied solely upon that of Macnaghten, things might have gone differently, but he asked advice from all around him, and took the last that was offered, only to change his mind again when he heard the opinion of a fresh counsellor. He was himself conscious that the position was too onerous for him, and sent down a medical certificate of his incapacity for action, and requested to be relieved. The request had been granted, and he was to have returned to India with Macnaghten, but unhappily no other officer had been appointed to succeed him. It is upon Lord Auckland, rather than upon the unfortunate officer, who, in the teeth of the advice of his counsellors and of all common sense, was thrust into a position for which he was wholly unsuited, that the blame of the catastrophe of Cabul should be laid.

Macnaghten, in hopes that Brigadier Shelton, a brave officer, but hot-tempered and obstinate, would be able to influence the general and to put an end to the deplorable indecision that paralysed the army, persuaded Elphinstone to send for him to come in from the Bala Hissar to the camp and bring in with him a regiment of the Ameer's troops. He came into the cantonment of the 9th, and his arrival was hailed with the greatest satisfaction, as it was believed that at last something would be done. Unfortunately, however, Shelton's energy and the general's weakness were as oil on water. No two men were less calculated to pull together. Shelton enforced his arguments with a vehemence that seemed to the general insubordinate in the extreme; while the brigadier, on the other hand, was unable to make allowance for the physical and mental weakness of the general, and was maddened by the manner in which orders that had but an hour before been issued were countermanded.

On the morning of the 10th the enemy mustered in great force, and occupying a small fort within musket-shot of the defences, opened a galling fire. Macnaghten only obtained the general's consent to a party going out to capture the fort by telling him that unless he gave the order he should himself take the responsibility of doing so, for that at any risk the fort must be captured. Thereupon Shelton was instructed to take two thousand men and attack it. When they were on the point of starting Elphinstone countermanded the orders. Shelton, in a fury, laid the case before the envoy, who was as eager as himself, and the general was again persuaded to give the order and the force advanced.

It was intended to blow open the gate with powder, but by some accident only a wicket by the side of the main entrance was blown in. Led by Colonel Mackrell the storming party, consisting of two companies of Europeans and four of native infantry, advanced. They could with difficulty make their way through the narrow entrance, for they were exposed as they did so to a heavy musketry fire, but two officers and a few soldiers pushed through, and the garrison, believing that the whole column was following them, fled through the opposite gate. But unhappily they were not followed. A body of Afghan cavalry threatened to attack the storming party outside, and these, native and British alike, were seized with an unaccountable panic and fled. In vain their officers endeavoured to arrest their flight. The events of the previous week had terribly demoralized them. Shelton set them a noble example by remaining on horseback alone, and at last shamed them into returning. Again the Afghan horse approached, and again they fled. Again Shelton's expostulations and example brought them back. The guns in the cantonments drove the Afghans off, and Shelton led his men up to the capture of the fort.

In the meantime the handful of men who had entered the fort had been engaged in a desperate struggle for life. The Afghans, discovering how small was the number of their assailants, re-entered the fort and fell upon them in overwhelming numbers. When Shelton's force entered, Colonel Mackrell had fallen mortally wounded, and was carried into the cantonments to die. Lieutenant Bird, with two Sepoys, were the sole survivors. They had, when the enemy poured in, taken possession of a stable and barricaded themselves there, and had successfully repulsed every attack. When they were rescued their ammunition was almost exhausted, but they were uninjured, and no fewer than thirty dead Afghans lying in front of the stable bore mute testimony to the steadiness and accuracy of their aim.

Several small forts were abandoned by the enemy, and a quantity of grain was found in them, but as no measures were taken to convey it into the camp, it was lost again when the troops retired. Desultory fighting went on all the afternoon without any decisive results, and the next two or three days passed quietly.

In the meantime the moonshee was making every effort to bring over some of the chiefs to our side. Macnaghten was sending off letter after letter to the political officer with Sale, urging the necessity for an instant advance of the force at Jellalabad. On the 13th the enemy occupied a hill within range of the cantonment, and planting two guns there opened a steady fire. Macnaghten spent hours in endeavouring to persuade the general and brigadier of the absolute necessity for driving the enemy off the hill, but without success, and it was not until he took the responsibility upon himself that a detachment under Shelton was ordered to be sent. It was then four o'clock in the afternoon. The troops advanced in three columns, and the infantry rushed forward with such impetuosity that the two guns with them could not arrive in time to herald their attack. The detachment poured in a volley within ten yards' distance, but they were unsteady from their exertions in mounting the hill, and their fire took no effect. A minute later the Afghan cavalry charged down upon them. The attack was unexpected, the men in confusion, and the Afghans rode through and through the ranks. The British troops retreated down the slope, where they re-formed behind the reserve; the guns opened fire with great effect, and the infantry again marched up the hill.

Our cavalry now came into action and drove the enemy before them. The infantry carried the height, and the enemy fled, abandoning their guns. It was now getting dark. A party of the Ameer's infantry removed one of the guns; but the Afghan marksmen were keeping up a heavy musketry fire, and the troops, British as well as Sepoys, were so demoralized that they refused to advance and carry off the other. It was therefore spiked and rolled down the hill, while the smaller gun was brought by the Ameer's troops into the cantonment. The enemy, now strongly reinforced, attempted to intercept the retreat, but were beaten off.

On the 15th Major Pottinger and another officer came in wounded, and reported that the Ghoorka regiment that had been retiring from Kohistan had been entirely destroyed. They defended themselves courageously against overwhelming forces, and held the barracks they occupied until maddened by thirst; then they rushed to a stream, where the enemy fell upon them and cut them to pieces, the two mounted officers alone escaping after innumerable dangers. On the 17th Macnaghten heard that there was no hope whatever of assistance from Sale, who was himself surrounded with difficulties. He now urged that the force should all retire to the Bala Hissar, behind whose strong walls they could have maintained themselves. But Shelton vehemently opposed the step, which would have saved the army from destruction, urging that the abandonment of the cantonments would be an acknowledgment of defeat.

On the 23rd of November the enemy again appeared on the hill from which they had been driven, and a strong force moved out against it. Strangely enough, however, they only took one gun with them. The day was disgraceful as well as disastrous, for the British force was signally defeated and the gun was lost, and the troops re-entered the cantonment in headlong flight, hotly pursued by the Afghans till they reached the protection of the earthworks. Their conduct showed how completely the imbecility and vacillation of their commanders, and the effect of the insufficient rations on which they had to subsist, had destroyed the moral of the troops. The men who a month before could have driven the Afghans before them like sheep, were now unable to cope with them even when in superior numbers.

On the 24th Elphinstone addressed a letter to Macnaghten stating his opinion that their position could no longer be maintained, and that he should at once enter into negotiations with the enemy. He accordingly sent a message to the insurgent chiefs inviting them to send in a deputation to discuss the conditions of the treaty. Two of their leaders came in, but as they demanded that the British should surrender at discretion, giving themselves up, with all their arms, ammunition, and treasure, as prisoners of war, Macnaghten resolutely rejected the offered terms.

Angus had been constantly employed from the day he reached the cantonments. His work was to go out with small parties of the natives employed by the commissariat to bring in the grain that Boyd and Johnson had purchased. There was no slight risk in the work, for although the villagers were glad to sell their corn on good terms, the party who fetched it ran the risk of being cut off by any band of tribesmen they might encounter.

Of an evening he talked over the situation and prospects with the two officers. Absorbed in work as they all were, they were less influenced by the feeling of hopelessness than those who had nothing to do but to rage over the trap into which they had fallen through the incapacity of their leaders. Still, they did not attempt to disguise from themselves the magnitude of the danger.